Volume 18
Issue 3 Summer 1978
Summer 1978

Federal Mineral Policy: The General Mining Law of 1872: A Note
Gary D. Libecap

Recommended Citation
Gary D. Libecap, Federal Mineral Policy: The General Mining Law of 1872: A Note, 18 Nat. Resources J.
461 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol18/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

"FEDERAL MINERAL POLICY: THE GENERAL
MINING LAW OF 1872": A NOTE
GARY D. LIBECAP*

Property rights arrangements relating to ownership of natural resources have received increasing attention by economists, lawyers,
and other social scientists because of their crucial impact on production efficiency and income distribution.' Ownership rights to hard
rock minerals on public lands in the United States are assigned
through the Mining Law of 1872, and in a recent article to this
Journal Robert C. Anderson was highly critical of that law. 2 His
major assertions were that the Act encouraged premature prospecting; that it led to excessive exploration; and that the income distribution resulting from mining on public lands was inequitable, with
profits going to mining firms rather than to the Federal Government.
Unfortunately, they remain assertions since no data or hypothesis
testing was provided. This note does not defend the 1872 Law, but it
does take issue with Anderson's critique of it.
First of all, he argues that open exploration leads to premature
prospecting on public lands. This is certainly a possibility because
exploration has the dual purpose of locating minerals and establishing property rights.3 With competition for valuable ground mining
firms have an incentive to explore early, as soon as the added costs
are covered by the expected gains, in order to stake a claim to
ore-bearing land. If actual production is delayed, the compounding
of those prospecting outlays over time could offset any returns from
mining once it occurs. This is a testable hypothesis that requires
further analysis before it can be accepted as fact.
Anderson then goes on to argue that the 1872 Law encourages
excessive exploration; that is, the "wage" paid the marginal prospector exceeds the value of his contribution to the industry. According
*Department of Economics, University of New Mexico.
1. The literature is growing rapidly. See, e.g., the symposium on natural resource property rights in 15 NAT. RES. J. 639-789 (1975), and the articles therein. See also Libecap,
Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights,
(to appear in J. ECON. HIST. June 1978); Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property
Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975).
2. Anderson, Federal Mineral Policy: The GeneralMining Law of 1872, 16 NAT. RES. J.
601 (1976).
3. For a discussion of hardrock mining law, see ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAW OF MINING (1974). See also G. LIBECAP, THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE MINERAL RIGHTS: NEVADA'S COMSTOCK LODE (1978).
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to Anderson, this is because each new prospector depresses "the
incomes of earlier entrants to the field, so that in terms of their net
contribution to discoveries their effort is unjustified." 4 Unfortunately, he does not develop this argument to show how the depressing effect on intramarginal prospectors takes place. There is, however, a problem in tying this point with the previous one: If rents
have already been dissipated by premature prospecting, then they
cannot be exhausted by excessive exploration.' Anderson is faced
with a dilemma as to which effect occurs. Additional analysis,
though, can tell us whether or not excessive exploration is likely. A
profit maximizing firm will hire factors to search for ore as long as
the expected returns equal the marginal costs of the factors. The
expected returns are determined by the probability of locating ore
and obtaining rights to it and expectations regarding its extent and
quality, ore prices, and extraction costs. Anderson seems to mistakenly imply that there is a common property problem with hard
rock minerals, where once discovery is made exclusive property
rights cannot be assigned, leaving the resource vulnerable to new
claimants. 6 Inability to establish property rights, of course, would
reduce the returns to prospecting as additional entrants appeared.
This, however, does not apply to mineral exploration and mining
under the 1872 Law since exclusive ownership rights are assigned.
Once valuable ore is located, claims can be filed and a patent obtained.
In his discussion of income distribution and the impact of taxation
on mining firms, Anderson uses the common argument that a pure
profits tax will have no impact on production. What he overlooks,
though, is that such taxation could involve significant social costs.
One would not expect mining firms to remain passive in the application of a pure profits tax; indeed, one would expect them to employ
costly resources to evade the law, an activity which would lead to the
dissipation rather than the redistribution of rents.7 The question
then is, do the benefits of transferring income from firms to the
Government justify the costs involved?
Finally, Anderson's assertion that private firm decisions are un4. Anderson, supra note 2, at 609.
5. My colleague Ronald N. Johnson pointed this out to me.
6. The common property problem is discussed by Gordon, The Economic Theory of a
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POLITICAL ECON. 124 (1954). See also
Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource, 13 J. L.
& ECON. 49 (1970).
7. Rent dissipation has been discussed by Cheung, A Theory of Price Control, 17 J. L. &
ECON. 53 (1974). See also A. ALCHAIN & R. KESSEL, COMPETITION, MONOPOLY,
AND THE PURSUIT OF PECUNIARY GAIN (1962).
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likely to coincide with national policy objectives does not mean
those decisions fail to maximize social welfare. There is no necessary
reason for national objectives and social welfare to coincide. Policies
made on the basis of political expediency may benefit a particular
group but not society. Ronald Coase warned of this in the "Problem
of Social Cost":
Of course, it is likely that an extension of Government economic
activity will often lead to this protection against action for nuisance
being pushed further than is desirable. For one thing, the Government is likely to look with a benevolent eye on enterprises which it
is itself promoting. For another, it is possible to describe the committing of a nuisance by public enterprise in a much more pleasant
way than when the same thing is done by private enterprise. 8
In conclusion, as Mr. Anderson has suggested there is a need to
examine property rights institutions and the impact of the 1872 Law
on hard rock mining. As this Note has indicated, one must be careful
in developing the hypotheses to guide that examination, and decisions to change the Law must be made on the basis of research and
not untested assertions.

8. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 26-27 (1960).

